We examined in detail effects of priming in 2 mental rotation strategies: spinning (rotating in a picture plane) and flipping (rotating in depth around a horizontal axis) by using a priming paradigm of Kanamori and Vagi (2002) . The priming paradigm included prime and probe tasks within 1 trial. In the prime task, 16 participants were asked to mentally rotate an inverted object to upright. In the probe task, they were asked to judge whether 2 objects simultaneously presented were the same or different. In result, the priming effect was observed in the upright position in both strategies, but not in the inverted and intermediate position while using a flipping strategy. The result in the present study was consistent with that of Kanamori and Vagi (2002) . In conclusion, when the 2 strategies for transformation of inverted images to upright images are used, apparent differences are observed in each direction of rotation. The results suggested that mental rotation occurred during the spinning strategy, but another transformation of images rather than mental rotation occurred during the flipping strategy. The line-symmetrical transformation around the horizontal axis might be used in the flipping strategy.
Humans are capable of mentally transforming images in order to recognize objects that are presented in any orientation. Mental rotation may be used to gradually rotate internal images of objects as if they were in the physical world. Shepard and Metzler (1971) ingeniously demonstrated this concept by presenting a stationary picture of two objects made from connected cubes that a participant observed from different viewpoints. The observer was asked to determine whether the objects were identical. The results showed that the reaction time (RT) increased linearly when there were angular differences, as if one of the objects were being gradually rotated until it could be matched to the other. Subsequent studies have shown that mental rotation is generalized for the identification of familiar objects, such as letters (e.g ., Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Koriat & Norman, 1985; Koriat, Norman , & Kimchi, 1991) , ordinary materials (e.g. , Jolicoeur, 1985 Jolicoeur, , 1988 Maki, 1986) , the human body (Parsons, 1987a) , and human hands or feet (Parsons, 1987b) . Jolicoeur (1985 Jolicoeur ( , 1988 found, however, that in the naming task, the naming time was shorter when the object was at 180· (inverted object) than when it was at 120·. This finding was not consistent with the pattern predicted by linear function from O· to 180· in other studies of mental rotation. This result was not consistent with the pattern of previous findings (e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Koriat & Norman, 1985) . About the shorter reaction times for inverted images, Jolicoeur (1990) suggested that the rotation of a global image would not be necessary if an observer was able to identify some distinguishable parts of an object that could be recognized regardless of the orientation.
In light of Jolicoeur's finding, Murray (1997) explored the patterns of mental rotation of inverted objects. She asked participants to mentally rotate inverted images to upright using two strategies: (1) spinning , which is rotation within a picture plane, and (2) flipping, which is rotation in depth around a horizontal axis. She found that the RT was shorter when participants were instructed to flip the image than when they were instructed to spin the image in a normal/mirror discrimination task. Therefore, she concluded that, in Jolicoeur's findings (1985 Jolicoeur's findings ( , 1988 of the shorter naming time at 180· objects than at 120·, plane rotation in oblique orientations changed to depth rotation around the horizontal axis only when inverted objects were presented. Kanamori and Vagi (2002) investigated why the RT for the flipping strategy was shorter than that for the spinning strategy. They hypothesized that the shorter RT can be explained by the absence of object representation at the intermediate position between the inverted and the upright representations in the flipping strategy and investigated this hypothesis using a priming paradigm that included prime and probe tasks within one trial. In the prime task, participants were asked to mentally rotate an inverted image to upright and make a normal versus mirror judgment using a key response. In the probe task, the object identity task was conducted. That is, they were asked to judge whether two objects simultaneously presented were the same or different objects. Their results indicated that the priming effect was observed for the probe stimulus of plane rotation after the spinning strategy was performed , however, it was not observed for the probe stimulus of depth rotation around the horizontal axis after the flipping strategy was performed. The results showed that, in the flipping strategy, no representation was formed at the intermediate position. Therefore, they concluded that the difference in RT between the flipping strategy and the spinning strategy may be attributed to whether there is an intermediate representation or not.
However, in order to observe the priming effect, the RT of the inverted stimulus in the probe task was defined as the reference point for RTs of all the probe stimuli. The inverted image presented in the probe task was the same stimulus in orientation that was presented in the prime task. That is, the priming effect would be observed for the inverted stimulus in the probe task by its direct presentation and occurred by comparing each probe stimulus with the inverted stimulus in the probe task. These results imply, however, the following possibility: it is unclear whether inverted stimulus was primed by mental rotation or not. In order to eliminate this possibility, the stimulus in which the priming occurs needs to be compared with the stimulus in which the priming does not occur. It is considered that this comparison can exclude the problem of the inverted stimulus of the probe task in Kanamori and Vagi (2002) .
As the purpose of this study, the amount of priming was measured in the present study. It was reported as the "RT Difference" between trials in which the objects used in the prime task and probe tasks were identical, and trials in which they differed. It was assumed that the probe task would not influence mental rotation in the prime task, if the objects used in the prime task and the probe task differed within the trial.
It was predicted that if the flipping strategy was adopted in the prime task, the amount of priming in the probe stimulus of depth rotation about the horizontal axis would be greater than that in the probe stimulus of plane rotation. However, if the spinning strategy was adopted in the prime task, the amount of priming in the probe stimulus of plane rotation would be greater than that in the probe stimulus of depth rotation about a horizontal axis.
Method

PartiCipants
Sixteen undergraduate students (9 females, 7 males) of Kwansei Gakuin University participated in the experiment. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none knew the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus and Materials
Stimuli were line drawings of familiar objects on a black background. The stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor (Iwatsu ISEL IS-701 D) and within a frame area of 2.5' x 5' (128 x 256 pixels) of the visual angle in height and width on the screen. The viewing distance was 110 cm.
Eight objects were used: car, chair, cup, frying pan, kettle, pitcher, saucepan, and table (Figure 1 ). They were derived from a CAD database on a web site. Geometrical transformation of the objects was done with a 3-D rendering application (Meta Creations Ray Dream Studio 5.0J) . There were 12 orientations for each object: upright, inverted, 60' or 120' in a picture
inverted upright KANAMORI AND YAGI fl ip60 flip120 spin60 spin120 Figure 1 . The eight kinds of objects used in the present study. This figure shows cup and pitcher. The cup was used in the prime trials, and the pitcher was used in the nonprime trials . In the rotation task, inverted objects were presented . In the matching task, there were six kinds of the stimuli. Note that these stimuli were white line drawings on the black background and the upright image corresponds to the flipping strategy. If the upright image is reflected around the vertical axis, it corresponds to the spinning strategy.
plane (called spin60 or spin120, respectively), and 60· or 120· in a depth plane (called flip60 or flip120, respectively), and their mirror images.
Procedure
First, the participants studied the four drawings (car, chair, cup, and frying pan) depicted on paper. The normal images were defined as the drawings that the participants studied before this experiment, which included two training sessions and one test session. Before beginning the experimental trials, the participants were instructed to respond as rapidly and accurately as possible.
The experiment was conducted individually in a dimly lit room. The participant sat opposite the CRT and held a key box for responding. Each participant received 384 trials, which were divided into eight blocks, with short rest intervals in the test session . The order of each block was randomized. It took about 90 min to complete the experiment.
In one training session, the participants were asked to judge, using a key response, whether the upright object presented to them was a normal image or a mirror image. The participants were able to discriminate a normal image from a mirror image in this task. This training session consisted of 12 trials.
In the other training session, participants mentally rotated the inverted objects to the upright position in both the flipping strategy and the spinning strategy and judged whether they were normal or mirror images. Feedback whether the response was correct or wrong was provided on each trial, and if participants made more than one error, each training session was repeated.
In the test session, one trial consisted of two stimulus presentations in which the two tasks, called rotation and matching, were assigned (Figure 2 ) . In the rotation task, an inverted object was presented in the center of the CRT screen. In this task, we used the normal/mirror discrimination task used by Murray (1997) and participants had to retain the configuration of parts of an object. Participants had to mentally rotate the object to determine whether it was a normal or a mirror image of the one observed before the experimental sessions. The direction of rotation was either the spinning strategy or the flipping strategy and was SOfie response / prime tri als f:2UCl randomized for each block. The spinning strategy was in a clockwise rotation within the plane of the picture. The flipping strategy was in a depth rotation around the horizontal axis in order to direct the upper parts of an object to the viewer. The chosen strategy was presented as a written word in the center of the screen. It appeared 2500 ms before the stimulus presentation and lasted 2000 ms. After an interval in which the screen was blank 500 ms after the instruction, the stimulus appeared and lasted until a key response was made. The RT was measured as the time from the onset of the stimulus to the response. The matching task started 500 ms after the rotation task was finished . In this task, two objects were simultaneously presented side by side. The distance between their centers was 5' in visual angle. Participants were asked to determine whether the objects were the same or different within 3000 ms of the presentation . The orientation between them was always identical. The objects that were used in different trials were not the same objects as those of the prime task. There were an equal number of trials. The same trials were used to calculate the amount of priming effects. Half of the trials (called prime trials) presented objects identical to those in the preceding rotation task, and the other half (called non prime trials) presented different ones. That is, the prime trials had object compatibility between the tasks, whereas the nonprime trials did not. The car, chair, cup, and frying pan were used in the prime trials, and the kettle, pitcher, saucepan, and table were used in the nonprime trials. The amount of priming was then calculated by subtracting the mean RT of the nonprime trials from that of the prime trials. In this study, participants were exposed to one trial of each of the 48 trial types formed by a factorial combination of strategy (spinning and flipping), trial type (primed and nonprimed), response (same or different), and the probe view (inverted , upright, flip60, flip120, spin60, and spin120). Each block in random sequence was repeated eight times for each participant.
Results
We reported the RT results that satisfied the following two criteria. The RTs did not exceed 2 SO from the means of each condition for each participant. As a result, 2.5% of the data was excluded. The correct responses were collapsed over objects because no systematic differences were observed for the variable. In addition, the stimuli used in the matching task were defined as the flip view (the mean values of flip60 and flip120) and the spin view (the mean values of spin60 and spin120) because it was not the purpose of the present study to investigate the difference in the angles. Figure 3 shows the RTs for each condition in the rotation task. An ANOVA was performed on the mean correct RTs. There were two withinsubject variables: image (normal or mirror image) and strategy (the flipping strategy or the spinning strategy). The RT for flipping was shorter than that for spinning, F(1, 15) = 20.28, P < .001, and the RT for the normal image was shorter than that for the mirror image, F(1, 15) = 12.38, P < .01 . The mean accuracy is 97% or above in all conditions. It is not discussed further because its investigation was not the purpose of this study.
The means for amount of priming in the matching tasks for the eight Intraub & Richardson, 1989) comparing the RTs for prime trials with those for nonprime trials was conducted. 1 When the spinning strategy was used, the RTs for prime trials were shorter than the RTs for non prime trials in the inverted, upright, and spin view, t(15) > 3.86, P < .05. When the flipping strategy was used, the RTs for prime trials in only the upright view were shorter than RTs for nonprime trials, t(15) = 4.31, P < .05. Therefore, the priming effects were related to mental rotation: They were always present in the spinning strategy but only sometimes present in the flipping strategy (Kanamori & Vagi, 2002) .
In addition, an ANOVA was conducted on tile degree of priming in the matching task. There were two within-subject variables: view (inverted, flip view, spin view, or upright) and strategy (flipping or spinning). All the main effects and the interaction were significant; view: F(3, 45) = 5.71, P < .01; strategy: F(1, 15) = 7.36, P < .05; interaction: F(3, 45) = 5.23, P < .01. It is considered that the interaction was related to the difference in amount of priming between the flipping strategy and the spinning strategy, especially for the inverted image. The LSD test, p < .05, showed that, in the flipping strategy, the degree of priming for the upright view was greater than that for any other view, and there was no significant difference among other views, except the upright view. In contrast, in the spinning strategy, it showed that the degree of priming for the inverted, upright, and spin views were greater than those for the flip view, and there was no significant difference among other views, except the flip view. Furthermore, there was no significant difference between the upright views in each strategy.
Discussion
These results are consistent with previous findings (Kanamori & Vagi, 2002; Murray, 1997) . The results show that the priming effect was observed for the probe stimulus of plane rotation after the spinning strategy was performed, although it was not observed for the probe stimulus of depth rotation about the horizontal axis after the flipping strategy was performed. That is, it appeared that no intermediate representation was formed in the flipping strategy, whereas it was formed in the spinning strategy. These results are consistent with those of Kanamori and Vagi (2002) , whereas these results of the present study are inconsistent with those of Shiffrar (1999a, 1999b) . Also, the lack of an intermediate representation in the flipping strategy is inconsistent with studies that have shown that mental rotation is based on a process or representation that was analogous to physical rotation (e.g ., Cooper, 1976; Cooper & Shepard, 1973) .
Our results showed that intermediate representation was not formed by mental rotation in depth rotation (the flipping strategy), however, Kourtzi and Shiffrar (1997 , 1999a , 1999b showed that the intermediate representation was formed by the apparent motion of rotation in depth and plane. It was implied that the difference between two previous findings could be explained by the difference of "rotation" in the prime task: the dynamic stimulus or static stimulus used in the prime task. Shepard and Judd (1981) reported, however, that the process of both mental rotation and rotation in apparent motion was identical. That is, it was suggested that the difference between mental rotation and apparent motion was not the cause of the difference in the results of previous findings.
One possible explanation is that another transformation, not mental rotation , was employed in the flipping strategy. For example, Just and Carpenter (1985) assumed that rotation would not be required for Shepard and Metzler's (1971) task if the observer considered the figure as a corridor and took an imaginary walk within it while memorizing the directions at each corner of adjacent cubes. In other words , the relationships of local parts within an object might influence the formation of a global representation of the object. A different strategy can be used to explain individual differences in the mental rotation task (Just & Carpenter, 1985) . In the present study, however, observers could use the transformation that they proposed, because familiar objects, not cube stimuli, were used and the participant could not employ the strategy of taking an imaginary walk within it.
Symmetrical line transformation around the horizontal axis should be mentioned as another possible transformation . It is a geometrical transformation that is different from mental rotation. There are two points of evidence that can refer to this transformation: First, an intermediate representation falling within a rotational pathway is not formed in the flipping strategy. In view of the lack of an intermediate representation in the flipping strategy, the difference between the RT in each strategy reflects the time lag for forming the intermediate representation. Because the processing of the intermediate representation, which is formed by mental rotation, might be omitted in the flipping strategy, the RT in the flipping strategy may be shorter than RTs for the spinning strategy (Kanamori & Vagi , 2002) . On the contrary, it was speculated that the linesymmetrical transformation was more efficient in the transformation of inverted images than the formation of the intermediate representation .
Second, the upright figures in each strategy showed a priming effect in the matching task. The upright image was symmetrical to the inverted image around the horizontal axis. Therefore, we can conclude that the transformation of global images in the presented objects was conducted in each strategy. From these viewpoints, the flipping strategy may be not mental rotation with the lack of the intermediate representation but the line-symmetrical transformation that does not need a rotational pathway in depth rotation.
For example, when transforming 3-D objects, the flipping strategy is required to imagine hidden parts of a 3-D object: and to transform them mentally, a procedure that is impossible in the physical world . Even if it were possible to reconstruct a 3-D object by memory of an observation from various viewpoints, the identification of the ~1-D object would be very slow (Lawson & Humphreys, 1996 . In addition , previous findings (Parsons, 1987c; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) have suggested that the representation of hidden parts was formed in order to mentally rotate the objects in depth. These findings are inconsistent with the results of the present study, because the speed of flipping in the present study was much faster than that in previous studies (1020 ms in the present study versus about 4000 ms in Shepard and Metzler, 1971 , and 5000 ms in Parsons, 1987c) . The results of the present study show that rotation in the flipping strategy was accomplished even if an intermediate representation was not formed. Actually, the 2-D image that was presented was assumed to have been mentally transformed, although , in the present study, a 3-D object was used. That i .s, the cognitive system in the flipping strategy may be assumed to employ a line-symmetrical transformation of the 2-D image and not a mental rotation of a 3-D object. In addition , the recognition of an inverted object may be more efficient in line-symmetrical transformation than in mental rotation.
However, the question is whether differences are due to qualitative differences in application of the two transformations or not. In the spinning strategy, it may be easier to form the intermediate representation because the structure of the image is maintained, whereas, in the flipping strategy, the image changes dramatically in perspective or mental transformation. For example, in the flipping strategy, the bottom of the cup becomes visible, the shape of the handle changes, and the opening becomes larger. These physical changes to the image may be more difficult to imagine or imagine accurately. That is, the imagined "flip60 and flip120" may be lower quality than the "spin60 and spin120." Thus, priming effects would be expected to be lessened or eliminated even though mental rotation is occurring. However, the question may be solved by the line-symmetrical transformation, because it is speculated that it may be more efficient to adopt the line-symmetrical transformation than mental rotation, if it is difficult to imagine the inverted image in the flipping strategy.
One unexplained result from this study is that the inverted figures in the rotation task affected the matching task differently. Their priming effects should have been equal in each strategy because they were directly presented as stimuli in all the trials. As noted above, the inverted image might be influenced by the priming task. In other words, we can say that this result may provide a clue to understanding the differences between the strategies: Both the image of departure and that of destination in rotation may be required when mental rotation is conducted. In the spinning strategy, the priming effect for all probe stimuli was observed. This result shows that mental rotation was conducted in the spinning strategy. In contrast, if the flipping strategy was not mental rotation, the result that the priming effect of the inverted image in the flipping strategy, which was not observed, would not be unexplainable. Because the flipping strategy could be not mental rotation but another transformation, symmetrical line transformation around the horizontal axis, it might be unnecessary to require the image of departure in rotation.
The priming paradigm employed in the present study can be used to investigate the process of mental transformation in a static image as well as apparent motion in a dynamic image. In the current study, this process of mental transformation in inverted objects could be investigated by using this priming paradigm. It is suggested that future studies should investigate the dynamics of mental imagery by using the priming paradigm.
In conclusion, we have shown that mental rotation occurred during the spinning strategy and not during the flipping strategy. We have also demonstrated the possibility that flipping may involve a symmetrical line transformation with respect to a horizontal axis and that the recognition of inverted objects may be more efficient in mental symmetrical transformation than in mental rotation.
